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ABSTRACT: In Pakistan different conflicts require different legal venues and different stages of the same conflict may
require plural legal venues. Attempts by the Pakistan government to undermine traditional conflict arbitration have not
eradicated these processes. This paper argues that none of the current legal venues available to Pakistanis is sufficient
without recourse to the others. The three venues are Islamic law (shari'at), the Pakistani civil code and traditional
arbitration systems in the form of jirga or panchayat (or their equivalents). While the first two may arguably be classified
as modernist legal systems with compatible objectives, the third is distinctly different. Traditional arbitration serves
collective interests for group harmony rather than addressing questions of "justice", as I will explain below. In this way,
traditional justice systems enable Pakistan's polyethnic population, with competing ideologies and conflicts of interest,
to contain disputes and tension in the face of extreme economic, environmental and political instability.
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Conflict management in Pakistan provides a useful example
of legal pluralism in practice. There are two state sanctioned
legal domains, shari'at (the Islamic code of law) applicable
to domestic affairs, and the civil and criminal codes of the
Pakistani state which officially handle all other matters.
Customary conflict resolution procedures, however, remain
widespread and frequently employed. The resultant hybrid
system offers some limited possibilities of addressing
interests in more than one venue. This paper addresses some
of the differences between these legal domains and why
individuals adopt particular strategies when there is a choice
of competing domains. My arguments are based on
ethnographic research undertaken in northern Punjab,
Pakistan in a landlord dominated rural area. Elsewhere
(Lyon 2002) I have discussed ways of modelling some of
the complexity of customary arbitration and intervention
during conflicts; however, in this paper I confine the
discussion to the importance of conflict deferment in
customary arbitration. Ultimately I suggest that local

arbitration in Pakistani Punjab addresses collective desire
for resumption of normative behaviours at the expense of
individualised notions of "justice", though in some cases
the two goals may be satisfied simultaneously.
Instability is one aspect of the kind of development (or
underdevelopment) that Pakistan has undergone since
independence. Landlords frequently bear the brunt of
responsibility for Pakistan's underdevelopment. Urban
Pakistanis seem fond of explaining to visitors that landlords
impede development and intentionally keep the rural areas
"backward" in order to maintain control. The relationship
between landlords and peasants is seen as exploitative and
unfair. Dispute settlement systems are said to be biased in
favour of landlords, which leaves peasants without legal
representation. A director at the World Bank expressed this
dissatisfaction with Pakistani landlords in an article in
Dawn, one of the major Pakistani daily newspapers:
... at the time of independence, Pakistan had a land tenure
system in Punjab and Sindh dominated by zamindars and
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jagirdars. Basically, the zamindars and jagirdars possessed
large tracts of land and practised an exploitative system in
which peasants were without legal protection and the forum
of settlement of disputes was heavily biased in favour of
the zamindars (Husain 1999).
Long before either overt Marxist or modern Western
liberal economic theories surfaced in South Asian social
sciences, however, landlords and the structures of power
in the rural areas were subject to criticism. Sir Malcolm
Darling, a British colonial administrator no less, wrote in
the first half of the 20th century that "... the landlord is too
often just a parasite" (1947: XXIX). He also accused
landlords of being an impediment to agricultural development:
... the landlord who lives on his rents ... has little desire
to develop his lands, as his rents are generally sufficient to
maintain him in comparative ease, and more than this he
does not usually desire. For him, therefore, agricultural
development is less a matter of economic need than of
social obligation (emphasis added; 1947: 257–258).
Darling's economic survey of the Punjab is highly
instructive. His conclusions and recommendations would
not be out of place within current debates in Pakistan on
the best strategies for agricultural development; however,
Darling's appraisal of landlords is ambiguous. While on
the one hand he is generous in his criticism of absentee
landlords, he recognises the social obligations incumbent
on residential landlords. He writes that:
... a good landlord is a valuable addition to a countryside
of peasants. He will finance his tenants at low rates of
interest, perhaps charge no interest at all; he will settle their
disputes, stand by them in times of stress, and lend them
implements and make experiments which they cannot
afford (1947: XXIX).
At the risk of being accused of being an apologist for
rural elites, I want to focus on these "good" landlords and
in particular their role in dispute settlement. Landlords, or
zamindars, who live in the villages in which they own land,
are part of those communities and have little choice but to
respond to the communities' demands. Pakistani peasants
do not seek "legal protection" from the government in the
first instance because they know that it will not be
forthcoming. They hesitate to go to formal courts because
in most cases the objective of the courts is incompatible
with the objective of the plaintiffs. Moreover, I disagree
with Pakistani urbanite condemnations of landlords for one
further reason; landlords provide the bridge for a society
which is shifting from traditional patterns (disrupted by
colonialism, wars, population explosion, radical economic
transformations etc.) and emerging patterns of modernity,
by which I mean a shift towards Weberian rational-legal
authority. Without this bridge, the burden of transition
would fall predominantly on the state, a burden for which
it is currently ill-equipped.
Rural elites act as arbiters in local disputes. Their
position as educated, literate members of the community
in addition to their personal and family networks, which
include police and other government officials, are an
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important resource for villagers. At times this arbitration
takes place within very formal indigenous structures and
at other times it is very informal. Disputes between
individuals or groups within the village may have serious
ramifications on village harmony and so landlords feel
responsible for containing tensions and defusing them.
There is therefore a fundamental difference between the
motivation of landlord dispute resolution and state court
systems. Local arbitration seeks, above all, to defuse and
defer conflict rather than actually bring about definitive
resolution. State courts are unable to deal with parties that
may not seem formally involved with a particular case and
strive rather to arrive at decisions which, in principle, should
put to rest particular disputes. I argue that far from resolving
disputes between parties, local arbitration satisfies wider
community needs for a suppression of conflict.
I contest the argument put forth by Ahmad (1977) that
village "settlement" works due to "negative" sanctions but
serves only to strengthen landlord interests. Ahmad argues
that landlord intervention is corrupt and founded on the fear
of negative sanctions (1977: 104–105). Ahmad's assessment
of the case is not entirely wrong but he ignores the possibility
that local level dispute resolution may not be governed by a
sense of justice for individuals but rather a desire to prevent
disputes from spreading to the wider community.
I will look at three cases of arbitration that illustrate
some of the limitations of local arbitration as well as some
of the strengths. All of these cases come from Northern
Punjab in northeastern Attock District and are based on
fieldwork conducted there between 1998 and 1999. The
first case provides an example of a situation that highlights
the overlapping jurisdiction of many conflicts. It involves
a child custody case in the village in which the disputing
parties were from different locations, one of which fell
outside the direct sphere of influence of any one set of
landlords. The second case is typical of the kinds of disputes
that provoke formal arbitration council hearings (jirga).
Land disputes between landlords must be contained or they
risk causing disruption across all socio-economic layers
of the village. This dispute demonstrates the palliative, yet
inconclusive nature of jirga decisions. The final case study
shows the clearest case of local arbitration functioning
effectively. A relatively minor dispute, but one which had
the potential to cause great disruption to economic activities
in the area, was dealt with summarily by one of the
landlords. Although the landlord who finally settled the
conflict may have been pursuing his own objectives in
allowing the dispute to arise at all, in the end he was able
to contain hostilities sufficiently so that life could resume
as before.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION
From the early days of Malinowskian anthropology,
anthropologists have recognised that analysing conflict can
be a useful way of making sense of society. Llewellyn and

Local Arbitration and Conflict Deferment in Punjab, Pakistan

Hoebel (1941) argued that studying societies' methods for
dealing with conflict is a useful way to understand the social
norms and values. Gluckman (1955; 1965) and Bohannan
(1957) examined conflict resolution for the mechanisms it
provides society to reinforce and reproduce itself and its
underlying values. Comaroff and Roberts (1981) suggest
that there should not be a distinct sub-field such as legal
anthropology; the law, they argue, is such an integral part
of culture and society that it makes no sense to pretend
that it can be studied in isolation. More recently, Caplan
(1995) and Moore (1995), in critically re-evaluating the
work of Gulliver and Habermas, have examined competing
inductive and deductive approaches to the analysis of
dispute. Either approach is in fact attempting to unravel
other (i.e. non-legal) aspects of culture and society. Colson
(1995), while arguing against the notion that dispute
settlement is about a restoration of communitas, points out
that the theatricality of dispute settlement renders it
particularly compelling subject matter for both locals and
anthropologists (see Zeitlyn 1994 for a case in which
dispute resolution is used to help understand local religious
practice). Disputes offer participants and observers a means
to assess relationships and qualities, which may be unrelated
to particular disputes. Conflicts offer opportunities to
elucidate competing social models within a society. Conflict
resolution studies and comparative law are therefore not
necessarily primarily concerned with the law or with dispute
negotiations, but rather with what these can tell us about
more elusive cultural patterns.
To the extent that conflict may paradoxically serve both
fusionary and fissionary roles, it should not necessarily be
seen as something that individuals within a society might
feel the need to completely eradicate. This is particularly
relevant to the apparent absence of definitive conflict
resolution in Punjabi arbitration in contrast to some other
customary judicial processes. The Barotse, for example,
may have striven for more definitive resolution. The
Barotse judicial process, Gluckman says "corresponds with,
more than it differs from, the judicial process in Western
society" (1967: 80). There are, nonetheless, important
similarities with the traditional legal process of Barotse
land. The evidential phase of Barotse trials is remarkably
similar to Punjabi dispute settlements:
In order to bring out all the facts that are relevant to this
kind of dispute, the judges allow each party to recite the
full tale of his grievances. The judges, who at the capital
may number a score or more, helped by anyone else
attending the session, cross-examine the parties as well as
the witnesses these have brought. They call for further
evidence. There is no paring down of the facts in advance
for presentation to court, and any judge who knows the
parties may contribute that knowledge; the fiction of
judicial ignorance is missing in all respects ... (1965: 9).
In Punjab the notion of judicial ignorance is not only
absent, it is antithetical to the principle which lends
credibility to the proceedings. Judges, or arbiters, are
presumed to have prior knowledge of the individuals and

facts involved. This is cited as one of the reasons they are
more just. Like the Barotse, Punjabi arbiters allow
participants the opportunity to air their grievances. This
includes parties who may have no direct involvement in
the dispute in question but who may be affected by the
consequences of the dispute. Judges, or arbiters, are
expected to interrogate the disputing parties and all
witnesses. All information may be presented to the judges
regardless of its conformity to formal requirements of
inclusion (of which there are no firm rules). Finally, like
the Barotse, the judges are expected to make use of all of
their knowledge, including knowledge that may not have
emerged from the trial, to arrive at a settlement which is
perceived as fair.
Al-Krenawi and Graham, looking at a specific conflictresolving ritual among the Bedouins, argue that mediation
occurs in two ways. The first reinstates a "sense of mutually
agreed upon justice" between individual disputants while
the second restores "stability, order, and harmony to social
relations" (1999: 163). They stress the potentially therapeutic
benefits to participants in the ritual. In their case studies
however, what is striking is that the bisha conflict-resolving
ritual seems not to address any of the underlying causes of
conflict.1) In both the Bedouin and Punjabi cases the
potential for similar disputes remains open. Rather than
resolving disputes, traditional arbitration councils seem to
defer disputes for the benefit of the community or
communities affected. The underlying goal of arbiters is
not to see justice done – which they often have an extremely
hard time enforcing in any event – but rather to effect a
resumption of normal relations within the community. With
this goal in mind it would seem that absolute concepts of
"justice" or "right" are irrelevant (though certainly not
irrelevant to the discourse of arbitration). This differs from
the underlying goal of a legal system built, in large part,
upon a British legal system that seeks to create a corpus of
precedents which may play the role of law and which may
be enforced by the executive arm of the State. Customary
law, Quranic law, British law and post-independence
Pakistani law co-exist and make the process of adjudication
exceedingly complex. In part this plural legal system helps
explain the existence of parallel legal structures and why
any single legal structure in the country seems woefully
inadequate to deal with all situations.

LEGAL SYSTEMS
The formal legal system of Pakistan came out of the Islamic
legal tradition (as practised in South Asia under the
Moghuls)2) and the British legal tradition (as practised in
the colonies).3) Since independence Pakistan has attempted
to rid itself of customary law, in so far as the formal courts
are concerned. The state's attempts at judicial reform4) of
the legal tradition notwithstanding, Pakistani courts remain
confusing and intimidating. This should be no surprise
given the rather chaotic background from which they were
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created. The state has implemented shari'at to govern
domestic law. Shari'at, which began as a pragmatic attempt
to cross cut indigenous loyalties both in Arabia and the
peripheries of the Islamic world, today may be seen as a
viable modernist legal code. The Pakistani state's adoption
of the shari'at and British legal systems has left little room
for customary law in the formal court system of Pakistan
today. Effectively the only decisions that may be based on
custom are those of the arbitration councils in the rural
areas. Decisions based on customary law become
problematic in urban situations where populations have
come from a dozen or more different sub-cultures, each
with its own customary law. The lack of uniformity between
customary laws of different regions (even within one
province) has served to undermine these traditional judicial
systems in areas of intensive migration. Nevertheless,
traditional justice in the villages remains common.
Chaudhary (1999) suggests that the role of traditional
justice in Punjab has undergone dramatic change with
modernisation. Prior to the introduction of the Basic
Democracies Act, under Ayub Khan in the 1960s, the
traditional system had both authority and power. Traditional
punishments, he says, were effective. He lists these as
ostracism, fear of disgrace, fines and a variety of other
highly situational punishments (1999: 101–105). With the
introduction of centralised justice, the traditional systems
began to lose some legitimacy (though this did not happen
immediately – he writes that the initial state sponsored
adjudicators were not deemed respectable enough to replace
traditional arbiters or judges – 1999: 107–108). As the
villages become more embedded in capitalist market
activities the authority of traditional systems has become
even further eroded (1999: 108–110).
Local narrative accounts of arbitration suggest that these
councils had more authority in previous generations. At
the time that Barth, Eglar or Ahmad carried out their
fieldwork (in the 1950s and 1960s), it may well have been
that the traditional judicial system was significantly
different to what exists today. I want to be very careful
about making comparisons with the past since Pakistan
has clearly undergone major changes over the past 30 years;
however, I suggest that the role that I propose in this paper
has probably always been an important aspect of traditional
arbitration. That is, arbitration councils have probably
always served to defer conflict thereby circumventing the
need to resolve disputes. In the past, they may also have
provided more definitive solutions, such as Gluckman
suggests Barotse jurisprudence does, but with the
introduction of state courts and police they have foregone
this role, if indeed they ever had it. I suggest that like the
Tiv (Bohannan 1967: 53), in Pakistan, any corpus juris
which exists is a post-event construction (as far as I can
tell only an activity of anthropologists) and does not serve
to guide traditional arbiters or adjudicators.
The legal tradition of Pakistan since independence, for
all its flawed, confusing and conflicting aspects, is an
attempt to create a precedent that may act as guide in the
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judicial process. It seeks to make absolute decisions in
particular cases and then generalise from those cases. In
so doing they establish an explicit blue print of "legal" and
"illegal" and more philosophically "right" and "wrong".
Moreover it has formal pretensions to neutrality which are
not always achievable but are at least present. Decisions in
Punjabi arbitration, as I will demonstrate, have a very
different goal that is similar with the origins of the shari'at
in Arabia and its application during the expansion of Islam
but incompatible with what shari'at has become. Its goal
is to facilitate normality within the community by
preventing excessive disruption to groups and it may
achieve this goal through partiality and pragmatism without
fear of setting future precedent. The role of arbitration is
to defuse the present situation; it is not to establish a
principle by which all similar situations may be governed.
CASE STUDIES5)
Case One: Child Custody
The first case study illustrates one of the most serious
shortcomings of arbitration. The failure of this case is due
in part to a possible miscalculation in the jirga council
selection but also to the fact that this was a case where loss
was completely unacceptable to both parties. All compromises
ended up being interpreted as a loss. Furthermore one of
the parties who was by consensus in the wrong, was
sufficiently financially independent and distant from the
members of the jirga council that they felt they could take
the risk of not complying with the jirga decision.
In Islam children are considered to belong to their father's
family and religion. Fathers are deemed in all cases to be
the "guardians" of their children; however, Islam recognises
that in the interest of young children it is the mother who
should care for them. In cases of separation or divorce the
age at which children may be separated from their mother
differs by sect from two to seven years of age and by custom
often older (mid teens). The person caring for the child
must be "sane, trustworthy and of good morals" (Pearl
1988: 92). In the event that the mother does not satisfy
these requirements it may be necessary to remove young
children from the mother's care and place them in the care
of other female relatives – usually from the father's side.
Equally if the father may be demonstrated to be insane,
untrustworthy or of bad morals, he may lose his rights of
guardianship. Within Islam, however, this would not
necessarily mean that the children would be left with the
mother and her family, but rather with other members of
the father's family. In the event of the death of the father
children may normally live with their mother until the age
they would go to live with their father in cases of divorce.
In the following case it was the mother who died, leaving
her husband with a two-year old daughter.
Abdul, the father, was born and lived in a nearby village.
His wife had come from one of the large cities in the area.
The marriage had been arranged by the parents and while
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they were not relatives they came from the same qaum.6)
When Abdul's wife became seriously ill, she returned to
her parents' home in the city to recover. Abdul had only
himself and his elderly parents in the house so they were
not in a position to care for a toddler and an ill woman.
When the woman died the little girl was in the care of her
deceased mother's parents. In the Barelvi Islamic tradition
prominent in rural Punjab, the bereaved should mourn for
forty days during which time they are available in the
courtyard of their homes to receive guests who come to
pray with them. During this time Abdul had no sisters or
sisters-in-law living nearby and his own mother was very
old so it would have been difficult to care for his daughter
during the mourning period. In addition Abdul said that he
had hoped that caring for the daughter of their daughter
would lessen the pain of his parents-in-law. Upon
completion of the forty days of mourning Abdul sent word
that he was ready to take back his daughter, at which point
he was told that the little girl would remain with her
maternal grandparents. Abdul arrived at the house and was
barred entry. His in-laws yelled at him and chased him
away from the house. Abdul's father, Javaid, became
involved at this point and tried to persuade his son's parentsin-law to be reasonable and return the daughter. He
reminded them of Islamic law and assured them that his
household was prepared to care for the little girl properly.
They also refused to be persuaded by Javaid.
Javaid decided that they needed the help of the local
landlords, the zamindars. He first approached a younger
Malik who was the son of the old Malik for whom Javaid
had worked years before. Malik Saddiq listened to the
situation and sent for Abdul to come tell the story again
from his side. Malik Saddiq had already heard that there
were problems from other sources but the situation was
potentially quite volatile so he explained to me that it was
essential to let every person have his or her say and to hear
them all. When Abdul had given his side of the story Malik
Saddiq then sent for a representative of the deceased
woman's family. Her brother came to the village and
accused Abdul of being a bad husband, bad father, a drug
user and a drinker of koopi, the locally brewed grain
alcohol. Therefore they had a right under Islam to keep the
little girl. Prior to this case I had hardly spoken to either
Abdul or his father so I had no idea what to make of these
accusations. I knew many of the people who used drugs in
the area and I had never heard Abdul's name mentioned
among them nor had I ever seen him hanging out in the
areas where those activities occur. Malik Saddiq dismissed
the accusations out of hand. He claimed that he knew all
the substance abusers in his village and Abdul was not one
of them. Abdul was a hard-working man in the building
trade. Malik Saddiq told me he could not comment on
Abdul's qualities as a husband or a parent but he had never
had cause to think that Abdul was abusing either his wife
or his daughter and so in the absence of concrete evidence
he was not prepared to take the charges seriously. The
brother of the deceased woman left unpersuaded. In any

event the goal of that meeting was not to persuade him but
rather to hear his family's version of events.
Malik Saddiq decided that the case required more
experience and clout than he possessed and sent Javaid to
his uncle, Malik Hafiz. Malik Hafiz was a retired police
officer who had a good knowledge of Pakistani law, shari'at
and local custom. He had served on numerous jirga councils
and had served as arbiter throughout Punjab. He was seen
to have the wisdom, maturity and authority to resolve a
case as complex as this one. At this point more men from
the village were brought in on the problem. Some of Malik
Saddiq's and Malik Hafiz's elder sharecroppers were invited
to review the problem and help in resolving it. Over the
following two months parties from the village went to the
nearby city and had long meetings with Abdul's parentsin-law and their family. After about five weeks they
returned to the village and announced that the matter had
been resolved. The grandparents of the little girl had agreed
to return her in exchange for a return of the dowry. Many
people told me that this was what the matter had been about
all along. The in-laws had wanted to make some money
out of Abdul and his family.
Abdul then had some of the dowry returned but not all.
He explained to me that he would return the entire dowry
when his daughter was returned to him. This was
unacceptable to his in-laws however, who demanded that
the entire dowry be returned prior to relinquishing control
of the little girl. Opinion among many villagers was that
the in-laws were not serious about submitting to the jirga
nor did they have any intention of giving back the little
girl. Since the in-laws did not live in the village there was
little more that the landlord controlled jirga could do to
them. The in-laws had their own patrons in the city and
did not depend on village landlords to provide favours (such
as jobs, food, references etc.). There was no one on the
jirga council upon whom they depended sufficiently to
cause them to comply with a jirga decision that they did
not like.
Abdul and his father had few choices once it became
apparent that the in-laws were not going to abide by the
decision. They then took their case to the Pakistani courts
system. They expect the process to take much longer than
the arbitration process and be very costly; however, if the
courts decide in their favour the police will enforce the
decision in a way that village landlords, outside their sphere
of influence, cannot.
This case could be seen as an outright failure of
arbitration, however, it did provide a "cooling off" period
for the father and his family. In the initial stages of that
case the potential for violence was high in spite of the fact
that neither side had a history of violence. The issue was
extremely serious and generated a great deal of emotion at
what was a very fraught time for everyone. The arbitration
sessions lasted approximately two months and when
a decision was reached disputants decided not to comply
with the decision but instead to pursue the matter with
Pakistani courts. From the point of view of the village which
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had close ties to the father and his family this is far less
disruptive than had he attempted to kidnap the child or in
some other way take matters into his own hands. His own
biraderi (patrilineage) would have been obliged to come
to his aid at a time like that. This easing of tensions,
however, did not eliminate them. The father may yet resort
to kidnapping, at which time a new round of arbitration
would no doubt take place to placate the man's in-laws and
prevent the level of violence from increasing. In the village
this case was seen as a failure because it did not result in
Abdul retrieving his daughter and certainly it failed to
achieve that. I argue, however, that if recovery of the little
girl had truly been the goal of the arbiters, they might have
accomplished it.
A special relationship exists between police and local
elites in Pakistan. In rural areas police are acutely aware of
the position that local elites hold. They rarely do anything
to directly offend them. In one village in the area the police
arrive at a landlord's home ostensibly to pay their respects
and drink tea, but in practice to declare their intention of
arresting someone in the village. At that point the landlord
either tells them he has no problem with the individual in
question being arrested or he would prefer the police let
him handle the matter himself. The police are perhaps not
entirely culpable in these situations. The police are more
aware than most people that prisons and jails are bad places
to put delinquents. Young men who simply have too much
time on their hands or have some youthful angst may form
lifelong patterns of criminality. A landlord, if he decides
to take an interest in someone, can effectively control their
behaviour by providing them work. If a landlord tells the
police not to arrest someone then generally what he is
saying is that he himself will provide the man with an
activity that prevents him from wrongdoing and will assume
the role of punisher if the need arises. That is the positive
aspect of the relationship. A more negative effect of the
close relationships landlords enjoy with the police is the
ability some landlords have to get the police to do their
punishing for them. When the offence is an offence against
Islam or against the statutes of the State, then it is entirely
appropriate for the police to be involved; however, there
are a few landlords (not all by any means) who have enough
influence with the police to get them to enforce unjust
situations. The police have been used in the area to dislocate
sharecroppers who were given deeds to land under
President Z. A. Bhutto's land redistribution schemes. Under
the law, ownership of the land was transferred to
sharecroppers but no one easily gives up ownership of
something that has been in their family for generations.
Landlords resisted and connived their way out of most
redistribution and what did manage to slip through the
cracks is occasionally taken back with force – sometimes
using the strong arm of the law.
Given that the landlords in the area and the police have
such an intimate relationship, it would not then be difficult
to imagine a scenario where Malik Hafiz asked the police
to help enforce his decision. This would indeed be a rather
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straightforward use of the police as the question of child
custody is clearly defined in shari'at codes (which are the
basis for Pakistani personal law). The deceased mother's
parents had no evidence other than their own declaration
that Abdul's character was immoral or that he was in any
way insane. Even if they had, shari'at would still have
proscribed that the daughter be placed with someone in
Abdul's family, not the family of her dead mother. Had
Malik Hafiz opted for this action then the level of
negotiation would not have been between Abdul and his
wife's family but rather between Malik Hafiz and the inlaw's patrons. Malik Hafiz would have had to persuade the
patrons of the grandparents that his actions were just, since
he might have had trouble influencing city police officers
to go against the wishes of their local patrons. To my
knowledge Malik Hafiz never considered turning to the
police, in any event he did not go to the police if he did
consider it. He also restricted his appeals and decisions to
the level of Abdul and his in-laws and did not include
patrons of the in-laws. Without criticising Malik Hafiz or
the other members of the jirga council, the implication is
clear – their priority was never the fate of the child nor
even Abdul. They became involved because they saw that
one of their clients was about to find himself in a position
in which his izzat7) and his family were being threatened
and in that position men may feel they have few options
other than violence. Had that situation turned violent, the
police would have become involved and Abdul, who is
considered by many, including myself, to be a good man,
might have found himself in far more serious trouble. The
pressure on his biraderi and his patrons to extricate him from
trouble would be high and therefore potentially costly for
everyone concerned. In short, the goal of the arbiters was the
resumption of normative (i.e. non- disruptive and non-violent)
behaviour on the part of Abdul and his closest relatives.
Case Two: Land Dispute
The second case also involved a formal jirga council. In
this situation, however, the results were more or less
successful, though by no means did they produce a
definitive end to the dispute. The dispute was between
paternal cousins over three generations and multiple jirga
sessions. The jirga decisions have been respected by all
participants until something changes, at which point the
dispute gets re-enacted with slight modifications.
At the turn of the 19th century there were only two real
landlords in one of the villages in the area. These men,
Malik Ali Khan and Malik Shafiq Khan, were related
paternally and one of the men had married a sister of the
other. This particular dispute arose after the death of these
two men. The eldest sons of each of these men, Malik
Khaled Khan and Malik Munawar Khan, both felt they
had a legitimate claim to small plot of land approximately
25 kanal in area (8 kanal = 1 acre) which had not up till
that time been cultivated. They could each trace a claim
through their fathers, however, Malik Khaled's paternal
claim was greater since his father had actually used the
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land during his lifetime for livestock grazing. The second
man, Malik Munawar, argued that the land had actually
belonged to his mother's father who was also a paternal
relative of his and that this double claim was stronger than
Malik Khaled's claim. A jirga council was established and
the two men ended their dispute peacefully. Malik
Munawar's grandsons claim that the jirga had decided in
his favour and Malik Khaled's grandsons argue the
opposite. The land remained uncultivated and continued
to be used only for grazing animals.
Malik Khaled had two sons; the elder was Malik Babar.
Malik Munawar had five sons. Malik Munawar died in the
1950s and his sons, the eldest in his early 30s at the time,
found themselves embroiled in a new attack on the land.
At that time they were distracted by disputes between
themselves on how to partition their land so perhaps they
did not give the 25 kanal of disputed land enough of their
attention. There was another jirga council that discussed
the issue and, once again, prevented any violence and
settled the matter. The sons of those men, however, disagree
on what the jirga decided. The land again lay uncultivated
and the men went back to dealing with more immediate
problems.
Finally in 1997, one of Malik Munawar's grandsons,
Malik Nadeem, made a bold move to establish once and
for all that the land belonged to him, or at least had rightfully
belonged to Malik Munawar (in which case he still needed
to establish that the plot would have gone to his father and
then to himself). He planted several hundreds eucalyptus
trees on the border of the land that adjoined land that he
was already disputing with his immediate paternal cousins.
He managed to plant the trees quickly and quietly enough
that Malik Khaled's son, Malik Babar, did not notice
immediately. When Malik Babar discovered the manoeuvre
he was furious. He demanded that the trees be removed at
once. Malik Nadeem first argued that the land was his
father's and his father's father's and he had the right. Malik
Nadeem also argued that if Malik Babar had thought the
land was his then he should have said something while the
trees were being planted. Lack of a claim at the right time,
Malik Nadeem argued, proved that Malik Babar was not
convinced of his own claim.
The stories now become extremely contradictory;
however, certain facts are agreed upon by all participants.
One of Malik Nadeem's sharecroppers took his goats onto
the disputed land to graze. There is some suspicion that
Malik Nadeem had encouraged him to do that by telling
him the land belonged to him. Malik Babar's son then
captured some of the men's goats and locked them up. When
the sharecropper came to recover the animals he was
insulted and told that the animals would be sacrificed to
Almighty Allah and given to the poor (this allegation is
hotly contested but there is no question that by this time
tempers were high). Malik Babar's son was called to his
mother's sister's home (the mother of Malik Nadeem). She
pleaded with him to return the goats because the
sharecropper was a poor man and the dispute was between

Malik Nadeem and Malik Babar, not the sharecropper. As
a favour to his aunt, Malik Babar's son told her to send the
sharecropper to the buffalo stable and he would return the
goats. When the sharecropper arrived he was not alone.
He had several male relatives who were all extremely angry
at the alleged insults and threats that Malik Babar's son
had made earlier. They insulted Malik Babar and his family
(again a contested allegation). Malik Babar's son then called
his servants who chased the sharecroppers away. Malik
Babar's son then got his automatic rifle and his pistol. He
met Malik Nadeem at Malik Nadeem's buffalo stable and
yelled at him. One version of the story is that Malik Babar's
son pointed the rifle at Malik Nadeem and said he was
going to kill him. Both Malik Nadeem and Malik Babar's
son deny this and say that the rifle was not being pointed
at anyone. Malik Babar's son says he told Malik Nadeem
he was furious and Malik Nadeem had to punish his
sharecropper, to which Malik Nadeem replied that the
problem was between the sharecropper and Malik Babar's
son. Malik Babar's son then said he was going to kill the
sharecropper. Malik Nadeem then, allegedly, replied, "Then
kill him! It's your problem, you deal with it!" Malik Nadeem
claims he made no such statement and that Malik Babar's
son has embroidered the story for my benefit. No matter
which parts of the narrative actually happened, the
following day Malik Babar and his son arrived at the police
station to file a First Incident Report (FIR) against Malik
Nadeem and his brother (who was not in the village during
any of these incidents).
At this point the rest of the family realised that the entire
situation was getting out of hand. Some of the elder relatives
stepped in to pacify things. They agreed that a new jirga
would be called to settle once and for all the fate of this 25
kanal plot of land. In the meantime, however, everyone
had to calm down. The sharecropper and his family left
the area, which eased tensions somewhat (there were no
mysterious circumstances to this departure – they were not
from the area originally so they moved on to another area
where they had not made an enemy of one of the local
landlords). The jirga council was made up of some
members of the family, some other landlords from the area
and one civil servant who worked for the National
Agricultural Research Council. All members of the jirga
had something to offer both participants, therefore refusal
to abide by the council's decision would potentially have
made some tasks much more difficult. The council met on
the disputed land under the same tents that are used for
wedding receptions. There was a generous meal provided
by Malik Nadeem. The jirga decided that both men did
indeed have a claim to the land but that Malik Nadeem had
been trying to use the land and it was adjacent to land he
had begun to cultivate heavily therefore he should get the
land. Since Malik Babar had a rightful claim, however, he
should be compensated. Malik Nadeem was ordered to pay
Rs. 350,000 to Malik Babar and his brother. Both men were
delighted with the decision and felt absolutely vindicated
in their actions.
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If the story stopped there then one could presume that
jirga arbitrations had effectively resolved the situation.
Malik Nadeem was supposed to pay the Rs. 350,000 within
one month. He arranged afterwards with Malik Babar to
pay within 6 months. After 6 months he still had only paid
one tenth of the agreed price but had begun serious
cultivation on the 25 kanal of land. Malik Babar began to
put pressure on him through other family members to pay
the money since the two men had stopped speaking to each
other. Finally after almost a year Malik Nadeem paid the
money that he owed to Malik Babar but not to Malik Babar's
brother. In 1999 Malik Babar's brother died prematurely
leaving a young son who was not in a position to pressure
Malik Nadeem to pay the money. In addition this young
man had very little training in being a "Malik" and so in
the first few months after his father's death found himself
besieged with requests for help from his father's, now his,
sharecroppers. Malik Nadeem would never admit that he
has no intention of paying and perhaps does not even
believe that, however, there is no indication that he has
any intention of paying quickly. If in ten year's time Malik
Nadeem were to die and Malik Babar's nephew decided he
wanted the land he would have a legitimate claim to half
of the land from Malik Nadeem's son on the grounds that
Malik Nadeem had failed to uphold his end of the jirga
agreement. Malik Nadeem might be able to defend himself
since he is an astute manipulator and negotiator, but his
son will be in the same position that Malik Babar's nephew
is in now – plagued by all the other responsibilities in a
Malik's life and unprepared for an attack from one of the
men that cared for him when he was a child. Although
Malik Nadeem is quietly criticised for not paying the money
promptly, no action is taken because he satisfied the most
important part of the jirga decision – he paid the most
volatile disputants, Malik Babar and his son. Furthermore,
he is using the land in a way that increases his family's
position in the area.
The goal in arbitrating the land dispute between Malik
Babar and Malik Nadeem was not to make an ultimate
decision of right and wrong. The situation between the two
households was growing more tense by the day and people's
izzat and their livelihoods were being threatened – both
highly prized entities in Punjab and NWFP. The risk of
actual violence had been realised, albeit through the
kidnapping of animals. The risk of violence to people was
high. Direct threats to kill people were allegedly made and
the police were becoming aware that there were serious
problems within the family. Once the police became aware,
then it was a sure thing that other landlords in the area had
learned of the dispute as well. The situation therefore
threatened both intra- and extra-village harmony. Land
encroachment is not restricted to family members after all.
Landlords seem extremely eager to "absorb" small bits of
land of their neighbours but are wary of encroaching upon
the land of other powerful landlords. If that Malik family
were busy feuding, however, the possibility of slipping
something by them increased. From the point of view of
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the other members of Malik Babar's and Malik Nadeem's
biraderi the situation risked exploding in all of their faces.
The fact that the same bit of land had been in dispute in
previous generations was not in itself terribly exceptional
and therefore probably not of immediate significance to
the men asked to serve on the jirga. What mattered was
that the disputants had arrived at a stage in which they
needed help to find a way to avoid actually killing each
other. For all the discourse of violence among landlords
there is in fact a great reluctance to use it. For most problems
the appearance of violence is sufficient but in some
circumstances the appearance simply is not enough. It is
on those occasions, I argue, when arbitration is most likely
to be called. Many in the village felt that the case had been
successfully resolved and yet Malik Nadeem had not paid
all of the money even two years after the jirga decision.
Success, however, is as much in the reconciliation of two
powerful branches of a very close extended family. Within
the landlord family there are still tensions but few people
expect that the same plot of land will provoke any more
disputes between those branches of the family for this
generation. The young landlord who has not been paid is
not in a position to contest Malik Nadeem and is unlikely
to be in such a position in the foreseeable future. The land
may be the centre of a dispute in the future but not at a
precisely predictable time, at some vague time in the distant
future (distant being perhaps ten years or more).
At the risk of being overly repetitive, I stress here that if
the goal of village level arbitration were actual resolution
of conflict, then this arrangement would be unacceptable.
Once the young landlord will have accumulated his own
power base, then it is almost certain that he will provoke a
dispute in the future. Since the land is unquestionably being
cultivated by Malik Nadeem's household, the issue will be
even more complicated and torturous the next time (just as
it was more complicated this time than in the previous
generation). Arbitration served to defuse a tense situation
without attempting to ask powerful men to do anything
they would feel obliged to refuse outright. Two close
relatives were given a solution that allowed each of them
to maintain respect and "win" without actually having to
do more than they were already prepared to do. Malik
Nadeem complains of the high price that the jirga council
set on the land, but since he paid just over half the sum and
will pay the rest in dribs and drabs, in fact he has done
quite well financially. It is as if he received an interest free
loan to buy the land, and before he has paid off the loan
the land will have appreciated in value to more than
compensate his inconvenience. Malik Babar did receive
his half of the money (though again much later than
promised) and has in fact been released from the constant
worry of keeping an eye on a bit of land he had no intention
to cultivate.
The only losers are the sharecropper family which felt
obliged to relocate, and the young landlord. The young
landlord, however, can also be said to have won in a sense.
He has found himself, like his father before him, often
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trapped between the wishes of his elder relatives. His
mother is also closely related to Malik Nadeem's mother
and he is very closely related to Malik Nadeem. Malik
Nadeem is one of the future "stars" of the village. Tense
relations between Malik Babar and Malik Nadeem place
the young man in a precarious position. Until he has
established his own network of well placed civil servants,
bankers, landlords, sharecroppers, etc., he must rely on the
networks of his family. The more of those networks he has
access to, the greater his chance of success as a landlord.
The money he is owed for that 25 kanal is a small price to
pay to have access to Malik Nadeem's network as well as
Malik Babar's. In one sense arbitration has worked by
defusing the situation, however, the arbiters and participants
left enough latitude for participants in the dispute to raise
the issue again at some as yet undefined time in the future.
Case Three: Semi-formal Arbitration on Kidnapped
Animals
The final case demonstrates how arbitration is only as useful
as the position of the arbiter. It involves a violent flare up
between sharecroppers over the right to graze animals.
A Pathan sharecropper, Gul Khan, had been told by his
landlord, Malik Nawab, to protect the crop from grazing
animals. The land had recently been opened to cultivation
by the introduction of a tube well and an irrigation scheme.
A Punjabi sharecropper, Manzar, had grazed his animals
near there for years and unless his own landlord ordered
him to stop, he was going to continue letting his animals
graze there. Gul Khan's landlord did not speak to either
Manzar or his landlord, who both lived in a different village,
so the issue remained between the two sharecroppers. After
several requests (according to Gul Khan), Gul Khan and
his brother captured several of Manzar's cows. They locked
them up in the courtyard of their house to make a point.
They claim that when they captured the animals they had
no intention of keeping them. Their goal was to get
Manzar's attention and force him to realise that there would
be trouble if he did not start complying with their request.
Unfortunately when Manzar and his relatives arrived to
claim back their cows, Gul Khan was not at home. His
wife spoke to the men through the closed door. They
insulted her (an allegation which Manzar and his relatives
deny) and insulted Pathans (an allegation which they deny
but something they did several times over the next few
days with witnesses). They returned home to find some
guns with the intention of returning to claim their cows.
By the time they returned, however, Gul Khan and his
brother were home and very angry that their ladies and
their origins had been insulted. They exchanged gunfire
but no one was hurt. Gul Khan sent his brother to their
landlord to intervene, because at that point he felt he could
no longer return the cows without a full apology, but he
could not negotiate directly with Manzar, who had insulted
his family honour, to get an apology.
Malik Nawab was away at a funeral in central Punjab
so his brother, Malik Shafiq, became involved. Malik

Shafiq is a devout Muslim with a very good education and
a liberal in his world view. He believes, like his elder
brother, in listening to people. He listened to Gul Khan's
brother and then sent for Gul Khan and Manzar to come to
the village. Both men arrived with relatives and guns. They
sat in the landlord's déra (or guest house) and glared at
each other. Malik Shafiq listened to Gul Khan's version of
events and then asked Manzar to tell what he thought had
happened. Manzar began his version of the story by
insulting Pathans and reminding Malik Shafiq that they
were both Punjabis. Malik Shafiq listened carefully, but
told him to forget about being a Punjabi in this situation.
This debating lasted for around half an hour, with Malik
Shafiq getting increasingly frustrated. Gul Khan wanted
an apology. Manzar wanted his cows. Neither man would
give the other what he wanted first. Finally Malik Shafiq
interrupted Manzar and shouted at him. He told Manzar
that he was a very stupid man and he wanted nothing more
to do with him. Malik Shafiq shouted that he would let
Gul Khan keep the cows. Manzar began to mumble
placating words to the landlord but he stormed out, followed
by a smiling Gul Khan and his brother.
For the next two days Gul Khan and his brother followed
Malik Shafiq around as if he were the top zamindar of the
area. Malik Shafiq paid little attention to them but he
continued to think about arguments he could use with
Manzar to persuade Manzar to apologise. Manzar and his
relatives appeared again on the night that Malik Shafiq's
elder brother returned home. Malik Nawab was told that
there had been a dispute but his younger brother was
handling it. He was delighted that his brother was taking
an interest in family affairs and decided to let his brother
resolve the issue himself. I was speaking with Malik Nawab
in another déra when his brother and Gul Khan stormed
in. They were yelling about how Manzar was an imbecile
who refused to see what was right. Malik Nawab listened
for a moment and realised that immediate intervention was
required. He yelled at both men to be silent. He sent Gul
Khan out of the room and asked his brother for details of
the situation. When Malik Nawab heard the story he
covered his eyes in exasperation. He ordered his brother to
go order Gul Khan to release the cows. Malik Shafiq argued
that Manzar had to apologise first. Malik Nawab yelled
back that those cows were a man's living and that his family
were suffering because he had said some harsh words in a
moment of tension. He told his brother that it was not worth
letting a family suffer just to get an apology for something
stupid.
The younger brother left the room and I asked Malik
Nawab why his brother had not made the same decision.
He smiled and told me that he was used to modern ways
and forgot that in this village a landlord had the power to
make things happen. Landlords, he said, must decide what
is fair and what is just, and if they can see clearly what
must be done, then they have an obligation to their villagers
to make sure it is done. In this case, he said, his brother
had forgotten the bigger picture of village life and was
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focusing on the small details of the case. He then assured
me that in the city his brother was an excellent negotiator.
Of the cases I have presented, this is the one that comes
closest to a real resolution. Although both the Pathan and
the Punjabi involved are free to attack each other and
perhaps may do so in the future, the second arbiter in this
case demonstrated his lack of patience with their problems
and his willingness to make an immediate decision which
satisfied his objective of harmony. The landlord was the
true winner in this case. Using his Pathan to do the dirty
work, he was able to show the Punjabi sharecropper that
continuing to allow his cows to graze on those plots would
be more trouble than it was worth, however he remained
outside of the fray. Had the Punjabi gone to their landlord
to complain about another landlord, the situation may
potentially have required more delicate handling, but an
argument, even one with guns, between two men who have
very little power, is not as serious a threat to the stability
and smooth operation of the two villages concerned. This
is even more true since one of the disputants was a Pathan
and therefore had no real base from which to organise
hostilities. He may have thought that the younger brother
of the landlord would stand by him, but he must have had
no illusions that the elder brother would. If he had lost the
elder brother's support, then he and his family would have
found themselves in search of another sharecropping
arrangement and as he reported to me, that landlord may
be irrational and have a temper, but he looked after his
people if they obeyed him. His experience in NWFP had
certainly taught him that there were worse situations. This
case is the most blatant case of arbitration for the sake of
group harmony. The younger brother, being urban educated
and trained, was in fact seeking a redressal of wrongs and
in so doing no doubt wanted to set a precedent which
villagers could point to and understand the limits. He was
seeking an absolutely "just" decision. This strategy is not
the norm for village level arbitration, as was patently clear
when Malik Nawab, who is village trained, intervened and
made a decision which suited himself and all other villagers
who might have got caught up in the escalated violence. In
this case, he judged that he had enough of a hold over his
Pathan sharecropper to enforce a decision. He also gauged,
correctly as it happens, that his Pathan sharecropper was
manipulating the situation for his own amusement and his
anger had already cooled by the time he arrived on the
scene. Since Malik Nawab decided that the potential for
violence could be contained without the normal niceties of
arbitration, he dispensed with them. This case might more
accurately be defined as arbitration followed by
intervention. Malik Shafiq had attempted to arbitrate a
resolution, while his elder brother had simply intervened.
Although it came closest, this case was still settled without
a final resolution; it is rather an example or restoration of a
certain kind of relations. The Pathan did not get his apology,
so the animosity between them remains; as they continue
to cultivate adjacent plots of land, the potential for flare
ups remains. Malik Nawab clearly was not concerned about
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future flare ups and perhaps felt that it was in his interest
that the two groups do not become too friendly. The Punjabi
sharecropper does, after all, work for a man who is a rival
in the influence and power stakes that landlords take part
in regularly.

CONCLUSION: ARBITRATION IS NOT ABOUT
RESOLUTION
Each of these cases illustrates both the strengths and
weaknesses of local level arbitration. The result of each
dispute may be considered a success if the objective of the
arbitration was group harmony and resumption of
normative behaviours. On the other hand, each case may
be considered a failure if the objective is the application of
"justice" in a manner which may be used to establish rules
and sanctions in the future. Chaudhary (1999) suggests that
traditional judicial systems may have once done this, but
if so, that role has since been passed on to the state judicial
system.
There is a flaw in the comparison of village arbitration
with courts, though obviously the two are related. Upon
examination of specific cases, it is clear that the overriding
result of arbitration is geared towards group harmony.
Notions of "justice" for an individual and the concept that
there are "absolute wrongs" are noticeably absent. The
objective in local arbitration, both the formal jirga councils
as well as the semi-formal arbitration by landlords or other
respected members of the community, is to avoid excessive
disruption to the wider population. Jirgas are called when
there is a risk that disputes may spill over and affect more
than just the individuals directly involved. Intervention on
the part of respected people is likewise requested when
disputants find themselves in a position where maintenance
of their izzat and/or their livelihood are seriously
jeopardised and in order to preserve those things, they
would be forced to commit an act which would expand the
nature of the conflict.
Pakistani courts, at present, do not serve the role of
maintaining community harmony. Shari'at, which governs
family law, and the criminal and civil codes of Pakistan
which grew out of the British tradition, ideally, operate on
a very different premise. Courts could serve this role,
however, it is incompatible with principles of modernity
in the judicial process. I will not attempt to offer a complete
definition of modernity here, as it would tend to distract
from the point of the chapter, but whatever else modernity
means it should include some notion of independent and
neutral judicial processes that are codified and cumulative.
That is, decisions handed down by courts should be made
upon principles of law, and those decisions enter the
juridical corpus which influences future court decisions.
Courts are poorly situated to try and prevent disruption
based on the predictions of the adjudicators. Furthermore,
if they acted in a prejudicial manner that merely appeases
the stronger disputant, while giving "honourable out" to
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the weaker, then they would not serve the wider public
interest. The presence of legal codes, such as shari'at and
the Pakistani civil and criminal codes, offers partial tools
to avoid prejudice in the judicial process, if they are applied
in a systematic and neutral way.
State court systems, in Pakistan as in the West, aspire to
ideals of modernity. Individual rather than collective needs
are addressed. Decisions made by courts may not serve to
resolve critical situations in a timely and expedient manner,
but rather to establish precedent which exists above and
beyond the needs of the day. The concept of modernity
implies the rule of law and the impersonalisation, or depersonalisation of distributed responsibility. I allude here
to Weber's "legal authority", which seems integral to
modernity (1947: 329–341). Within a society striving for
modernity, the occupant of the judge's chair is of little
relevance (or should be) and what matters is that the role
be fulfilled by an individual who has a grasp of the
precedents and procedures involved. In truth, nowhere is
this the case, and Pakistan is no exception. Pakistan floats
uncomfortably between a state court system which seeks
impersonal distributed responsibility and authority and a
cultural system which stresses collectives and patronage
where the people holding office represent the relationship
networks which put them there. A problematic combination
of "legal" and "traditional" authority.
Arbitration recognises that many people may have a
"say" in a dispute and, further, recognises the need to get
agreement from all affected parties. Arbitration does not
require any fundamental agreement but rather an outward,
public behavioural agreement. Disputants must walk away
claiming satisfaction with the result regardless of what they
may feel or think. Courts require no such compliance –
only that disputants obey with the decision and if they do
not, then courts have recourse to other State structures such
as the police or, at times, the military. Ahmad's argument
that villagers comply from fear rather than "voluntary
obedience" disregards the protective role that landlords
often play in the lives of very vulnerable people. Negative
sanctions exist, to be sure, but the most severe negative
sanction is in fact the withdrawal of aid rather than a
concerted or directed negative campaign against noncompliant individuals. In the western ideal world the
vulnerable would be protected by the State and not
dependent on the personal intervention of the right person
at the right time. In the reality of the Punjabi world, they
do depend on intervention at numerous critical points. No
individual is so powerful that he or she may simply rely on
the rules or laws of the State for "justice", and no community
is so unified, harmonious and economically sound that it
can afford to let itself be torn apart by the conflicts that
arise between constituent members.
To return to the criticism of landlords with which I began
this paper, it is difficult to justify heaping condemnation
and recrimination onto one class of Punjab's countryside.
Landlords do not provide the legal protection to individuals
that Dr. Husain (1999) seems to think they should; instead

they provide protection to groups, including their own. One
could argue that the status quo, which is in effect what
landlords are trying to maintain, serves only the interests
of landlords, however, that ignores the voluntary
participation of "peasants" and other poor villagers. The
majority of villagers have a vested interest in seeing the
status quo maintained, since it is through networks that
problems are solved in Pakistan – not through laws or
policies. Villagers reinforce the power of their landlords
not because they are forced to do so, but because they can
see the benefit of doing so. Moreover, it is in the interests
of all members of this diverse polyethnic region and country
that some powerful deferral mechanisms be in place. The
competition between groups, whether ethnic or of some
other type, ensures high levels of potential conflict; as well
as necessitating high levels of accommodation. The same
mechanisms for defusing and deferring tension between
equivalently powerful and autonomous divided categories
(such as ethnic groups or castes) may equally be employed
in intra-group conflicts which may potentially spread to
the wider society, thereby risking inter-group conflict. In
regions where such potential exists, the application of
modernist justice and application of the rule of law may
not effectively address some very fundamental conflict
issues.

NOTES
* Research in Pakistan was conducted over a twelve-month period
during three trips from 1998–1999. I thank the Economic and Social
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(Ref.: R 000 22 2784, Specifying Ethnicity in a Multi-ethnic Pakistani
Community). I am also grateful to Peter Parkes, Michael Fischer,
Alan Bicker, Nevill Colclough, Wenonah Lyon, David Zeitlyn and
Frank Stewart for advice and comments on the paper.
1)
Their analysis of the bisha ritual may be misleading. Frank Stewart
argues that Bedouin arbitration councils operate under very similar
premises as courts in Europe. They strive for definitive conflict
resolution whenever possible. They resort to this kind of ritual
only when they are faced with cases in which there is insufficient
evidence to arrive at such a verdict (personal communication
2000).
2)
Islamic law was introduced in South Asia in the early 8th century
when Mohammed bin Qasim conquered Sindh and under the
Moghuls enjoyed varying degrees of application/enforcement
(Pearl 1987: 20–21, Schacht, Bosworth 1979). The Islamic legal
code which was introduced to South Asia was itself an overlay
of Quranic law, as dictated by the Prophet Mohammed and the
Caliphs Umar and Ali, on top of the customary law of Arabian
tribes. The introduction of Islamic law was an attempt to replace
tribal loyalties and affiliations with Islamic community loyalties
and affiliations (Gilmartin 1988: 43–44), however, it did not so
much replace customary law as bent it. In the early part of the
Islamic era, adjudication was to some extent an ad hoc affair
trying to cope with problems as they arose among the newly
formed Muslim community (Pearl 1987: 1–7, Schacht, Bosworth
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4)

5)

6)
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1979). This tradition of pragmatism continued as Islam expanded.
Islam adopted some elements from Byzantine, Persian, Jewish
and Roman legal traditions, and variation appeared geographically
in how laws were enforced. Even within the Arabian Peninsula
legal schisms appeared relatively early on (prior to the end of the
Ummayad dynasty 750 AD – Pearl 1987: 8). Given that Islamic
legal codes were built upon arbitration in which the primary goal
was the establishment of a new community, then refined and
expanded in a pluralistic cultural and legal environment, the
traditional arbitration councils in the Punjab would seem to be an
ideal venue for the implementation of Islamic law. Indeed, there
seemed to be little real conflict in the practice of shari'at and
customary law in Pakistan until independence. Gilmartin (1988:
44) suggests that Islam provided the framework within which
South Asian Muslims were able to accommodate "competing
values" within a single idiom. The Punjab, up to independence,
therefore had a history of giving equal weight to customary and
personal law (depending on the religion of the person, personal
law changed).
The British gave statutory recognition to custom in the Punjab
Laws Act (1872). It stated that in questions of family, law
decisions were to be made based on either applicable customs or
"Mohammedan Law" (Pearl 1987: 34–35). British administrators
felt it preferable to root their legal presence in indigenous kin
based rules, rather than ones based on religion. To this end the
British conducted a survey to find the universals of Punjabi custom
and then established a code of customary law (Gilmartin 1988:
45–50).
Since independence Pakistan has attempted to reverse British
efforts to codify customary law with the passage of several acts.
First the Punjab Muslim Personal (Shari'at) Application Act of
1948, followed by the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shari'at)
Application (Amendment) Act of 1951 which ruled that in all
cases of succession involving Muslims, the decision was to be
dictated by Muslim personal law (Pearl 1987: 37). Since those
acts the government has attempted to strengthen the role of shari'at
law in family matters by introducing Shari'at Benches in
Provincial High Courts (1978), Hadd Ordinances which regulate
relations between men and women (1979) (Pearl 1987: 239–243)
and more recently the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's
attempts to pass the 15th amendment to the Constitution in order
that "The Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be
upon him) shall be the supreme law of Pakistan", expanding
shari'at well beyond the scope of family law. The Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (in abeyance since 12 October
1999), prior to the 15th amendment gives the Federal Shari'at
Courts the power to examine laws at the jurists' discretion for
compliance with Islamic law and repeal those deemed "repugnant
to the injunctions of Islam" (Chapter 3A, Section 203D,
Paragraphs 1–3). The State is striving for a modern judicial
apparatus in which judges are guided by law and principle and in
which their decisions may have far reaching implications in other
areas.
I have used pseudonyms throughout this paper out of respect for
the privacy of those involved.
Qaum. This may loosely be translated as caste or tribe. Islam
rejects Hindu notions of caste, but Pakistani marriage preference

7)

is qaum endogamy (preferably kin endogamy). Qaum is frequently
a disputed category and members of qaum which are designated
as occupational castes (barbers, cobblers sweepers etc.) often deny
that this is their qaum; nevertheless, the majority of marriages do
occur within these categories (see Fischer, Finkelstein 1991).
Izzat is usually translated as honour. I understand this concept to
be a reflection of an individual's ability to control him or herself
and those around them. A person with no control over anyone
else (or themselves) cannot "do" good izzat.
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